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SUSPICIOUS CLOSETS: STRENGTHENING 
THE CLAIM TO SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION 
AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE RIGHTS 
Margaret Bichler* 
Abstract: Ever since gay marriage was legalized in Massachusetts in 
2003, the gay marriage debate has consumed much of the American po-
litical conscience. While many important questions concerning equal 
protection, the institution of marriage, and modern conceptions of 
family have been asked, few have stopped to question what (aside from 
Judeo-Christian moral issues) makes homosexuals so wrong—so unde-
serving of the right to marry and have a family. The process of deviant 
identity construction and the optional “closet” must be comprehended 
in order for the gay claim to equal protection and suspect classification 
to be fully considered and appropriately evaluated. Once gays are prop-
erly regarded as a suspect class, laws prohibiting gay marriage will, in all 
likelihood, fail strict scrutiny analysis. 
Introduction 
 Recent polls indicate that Americans might soon be willing to 
accept civil unions between homosexual couples.1 However, the same 
polls reaffirm both American society’s refusal to accept gay marriage 
and a general disdain for homosexual individuals.2 As the debate 
centers on the pros and cons of gay marriage, little or no discussion 
focuses on what exactly makes any debate over gay rights so heated.3 
                                                                                                                      
* Book Review Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2007–2008). I 
would like to thank Dr. Wairimu Njambi and Dr. Mark Tunick, both of whom were instru-
mental in the research and development of this note. 
1 Gary Langer, Most Oppose Gay Marriage; Fewer Back an Amendment, ABCnews.com, June 
5, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/US/Politics/story?id=2041689&page=1 (last visited Jan. 
15, 2008). The poll results indicated that 58% of Americans believe gay marriage should 
be illegal, and 45% think civil unions giving equal rights to gay couples should be legal. Id. 
When 1002 adult Americans were asked whether they believed homosexuality should be 
considered an acceptable alternative lifestyle, 41% replied that it should not. Gallup Poll, 
May 8–11, 2006, pollingreport.com, http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2008). 
2 See Langer, supra note 1; Gallup Poll, supra note 1. 
3 See Josh Smith, Op-Ed., Meaning of Marriage, Phoenix, Sept. 29, 2004, available at 
http://www.loyolaphoenix.com/news/2004/09/29/ (follow the “Debate Ensues over Gay 
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The debate is fueled by the frequently unacknowledged historical 
process by which the homosexual identity was labeled perverse by 
those in the fields of science, medicine, psychology, and media over 
the last century.4 This process and the resulting gay identity of devi-
ance explain, to some extent, the general scorn for homosexual indi-
viduals and their pursuit of equality.5 Because of this attitude of aver-
sion, gays exist in a structure commonly referred to as the “closet” — 
effectively giving gay individuals the option of “coming out” and be-
ing discriminated against or remaining closeted and being treated 
equally to heterosexual individuals.6 Moreover, laws prohibiting gay 
marriage reinforce and maintain the notion that homosexuality is 
inherently wrong.7 Statutes that criminalize sodomy (whether limited 
to homosexual sodomy or not) deny gays equal rights and imply a 
moral and social inferiority to gay relationships and homosexuals 
themselves.8 The process by which homosexuals have been labeled 
deviant, the resulting closet, and the precarious legal status of gay 
individuals are highly suspect.9 Only when this background becomes 
an integral part of the gay marriage debate, and every debate con-
cerning gay rights, can the legal claims of gay individuals be properly 
weighed and evaluated.10 This backdrop can and should serve to 
                                                                                                                      
Marriage” hyperlink under “Discourse”). Smith summarizes the reasons cited for opposing 
gay marriage in America, which focus primarily on Christian doctrine, the well-being of 
children raised by gay parents, and the possibility that the legalization of gay marriage will 
lead down a slippery slope into the acceptance of polygamy, bestiality, and the like. Id. 
4 See Michel Foucault, 1 The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, 42–43, 97–
101, 105–06 (1990). Foucault explains the process by which the homosexual identity was 
constructed as deviant. Id. at 101. 
5 Id. at 100–01. 
6 Eve Sedgwick, The Epistemology of the Closet 67–68 (1990). 
7 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) (explaining 
that laws prohibiting gay marriage are based on prejudice against gays). 
8 Tex Penal Code Ann. § 21.06 (1993); Ga. Code Ann. § 16–6–2 (1984); see Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582, (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that a Texas law 
prohibiting homosexual sodomy legally sanctioned discrimination against homosexuals in 
the areas of employment, family issues, and housing); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 
199 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that the Georgia statute prohibiting all acts 
of sodomy denied “individuals the right to decide for themselves whether to engage in 
particular forms of private, consensual sexual activity”). 
9 See Foucault, supra note 4, at 101; Sedgwick, supra note 6, at 68–70, 86. 
10 See Foucault, supra note 4, at 101, 104–05; Sedgwick, supra note 6, at 18–20, 69–71. 
The construction of the deviant identity and closet structure are what make the homosex-
ual population a suspect class; the requirement of denying one’s identity in order to 
achieve social and legal equality is the very type of evil targeted by the Equal Protection 
Clause and suspect classification. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A The-
ory of Judicial Review 163 (1980); Foucault, supra note 4, at 43, 101; Sedgwick, supra 
note 6, at 69–71. 
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strengthen the gay claim to suspect classification within equal protec-
tion doctrine.11 
 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment de-
clares that no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”12 This clause was ratified to stop south-
ern states from enacting discriminatory statutes that attempted to 
maintain the social and political inferiority blacks had suffered as 
slaves.13 Since its ratification, the purpose of the clause has been ex-
panded to protect the interests of other socially and politically un-
popular groups from a potentially ill-motivated legislature.14 For the 
most part, the very process of democracy ensures that people’s inter-
ests are pursued by the legislature in its lawmaking—people vote for 
legislators whose interests align with their own and the need for re-
election maintains that alignment.15 But history has demonstrated 
that the democratic process can malfunction; a legislature representa-
tive of the majority can and will pass laws to the specific disadvantage of 
minority groups.16 The Equal Protection Clause works to correct such 
malfunction by prohibiting state legislation that denies persons equal 
protection under the laws or, in other words, that discriminates be-
tween similarly situated individuals.17 The clause, “by its explicit con-
cern with equality among the persons within a state’s jurisdiction,” is 
the Constitution’s clearest recognition that a voice and a vote will not 
always guarantee good-faith representation of everyone.18 
 Equal protection doctrine distinguishes between classifications,19 
and explains that a suspect classification is one which serves to disad-
vantage members of a group that has been historically discriminated 
against, denied political power, and is discrete and insular.20 Such a 
                                                                                                                      
11 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978); U.S. v. Carolene 
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938); Ely, supra note 10, at 82, 155–57. 
12 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
13 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 652 (2d ed. 2005). 
14 Id. at 617–19. 
15 Ely, supra note 10, at 82. 
16 Id. at 103. 
17 Id. at 98. 
18 Id. 
19 Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 619–20. In addressing equal protection claims, 
courts apply one of three tests depending on the individual or group making the claim: 
rational basis, heightened scrutiny, or strict scrutiny. Id. 
20 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357; Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4. For the purposes of 
this paper, “discrete” refers to one’s ability to identify an insular gay community or individ-
ual, and not the idea that one can or should sensor their personal expression of the gay 
identity. 
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classification is treated by the court as inherently suspicious, or sus-
pect; accordingly, it will only be upheld if it can withstand strict scru-
tiny analysis, which requires that the law be narrowly tailored to 
achieving a compelling government interest.21 Racial classifications 
have consistently been regarded as suspect because racial minorities 
have historically been disenfranchised from the political process and 
have a signifying trait (skin color) that is immutable and readily visi-
ble.22 John Hart Ely, a prominent constitutional law scholar, examines 
equal protection doctrine in his book Democracy and Distrust.23 Perhaps 
the most compelling aspect of Ely’s consideration of suspect classifica-
tion is his analysis of its purpose—namely, to identify the cases in 
which the democratic process has failed an unpopular minority leav-
ing them vulnerable to mistreatment by the majority.24 
 Despite the rigid criteria for suspect classification, the doctrine’s 
purpose of detecting and stopping efforts by the majority to subjugate a 
socially unpopular group reveals that the gay population is one such 
population deserving of its protection.25 Homosexuals have thus far 
been denied suspect classification because they do not fit neatly within 
the parameters drawn by the Court.26 However, the history of con-
structed deviance and the unique situation of closeted existence, cou-
pled with Ely’s analysis of the aims of suspect classification, will reveal a 
population more suspiciously situated than any this country has ever 
seen.27 
 This note seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of the 
process by which homosexuals came to be assigned a deviant and per-
verse identity and then to use this understanding to strengthen their 
claim to suspect classification and to marriage rights. Part I will situate 
the reader within the landmark court decisions that have punctuated 
the battle for gay rights in the United States and the discourse that has 
defined the gay marriage debate ever since that battle achieved minor 
success with the legalization of gay marriage in Massachusetts in 2003. 
Part II will summarize the process by which medical, scientific, and 
                                                                                                                      
21 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357; Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4. 
22 See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 653. 
23 See Ely, supra note 10, at 135–80. 
24 See id. at 152–53, 161. 
25 See id. at 145–46, 163. 
26 Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 532 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that the Supreme 
Court has never determined homosexuals to be a suspect class). 
27 See Ely, supra note 10, at 155–58 (explaining that more and more scholars are sug-
gesting that legislation rooted in stereotype should be regarded as suspicious); Foucault, 
supra note 4, at 43, 101; Sedgwick, supra note 6, at 71. 
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popular discourse created and maintained a perverse implantation and 
the resulting closet. Part III will examine the purpose of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and suspect classification, the complexities of the gay 
claim to suspect classification given the optional closet, and will then 
use this peculiar situation to strengthen that claim. Finally, Part IV will 
argue that if the laws banning gay marriage were subjected to strict 
scrutiny review they would be ruled unconstitutional.28 
I. Discourse of Deviance: The Legal and Social Understanding 
of the Gay Marriage Debate 
 Meaningful discourse on gay rights has been exchanged on both 
the legal and social fronts, but what has frequently made this ex-
change caustic is the underlying assumption of a deviant and perverse 
homosexual identity.29 This typically unacknowledged assumption is 
crucial to understanding the unique social and legal circumstance of 
being gay.30 Most importantly, only when the process of perverse iden-
tity construction is understood and accounted for can the claim by 
gay men and women to equal marriage rights, and equality in general, 
be properly evaluated within the framework of suspect classification.31 
A. From Bowers to Lawrence: The Process of Progress 
 The current legal battle for gay rights began in 1986 with the 
landmark case of Bowers v. Hardwick, in which a Georgia citizen chal-
lenged a state statute prohibiting all acts of sodomy after he was ar-
rested and charged with its violation.32 Hardwick’s defense argued that 
engaging in consensual sodomy was a private and intimate act pro-
tected from state prohibition by the guarantee of privacy under the 
Ninth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.33 Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court phrased the issue as “whether the Federal Constitution confers a 
                                                                                                                      
28 Though the same process which has labeled gays deviant and perverse has also 
worked to craft the perceived deviance of transgendered and bisexual individuals, this 
note will focus specifically on the gay population and its claim to equal marriage rights 
because, to date, this is where the debate and its surrounding discourse has focused. 
29 See Foucault, supra note 4, at 43, 101, 104–05. 
30 See id. at 43, 101; Sedgwick, supra note 6, at 67–68, 71. 
31 See Ely, supra note 10, at 155–58, 163; Foucault, supra note 4, at 43, 101; Sedg-
wick, supra note 6, at 69–71. 
32 478 U.S. 186, 188 (1986). Hardwick was never prosecuted but challenged the consti-
tutionality of the statute in a civil suit. Id. 
33 Id. at 189. 
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fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence 
invalidates the laws of the many states that still make such conduct ille-
gal . . . .”34 The Court ultimately held that the Constitution does not 
confer such a right, nor does the fundamental right to privacy extend 
to protect homosexual sodomy.35 Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing 
that if the fundamental right to privacy “means anything, it means that, 
before Georgia can prosecute its citizens for making choices about the 
most intimate aspects of their lives, it must do more than assert that the 
choice they have made is an ‘abominable crime not fit to be named 
among Christians.’”36 The Bowers decision provided a serious setback in 
the fight for gay rights as statutes prohibiting gays from physical inti-
macy stood as good law across the nation.37 
 Justice Blackmun’s argument that the right to privacy protected 
individuals’ right to control “the nature of their intimate associations 
with others” finally found support in the 2003 decision of Lawrence v. 
Texas.38 In Texas, this time, a citizen was prosecuted for violation of a 
state statute specifically prohibiting homosexual sodomy.39 Because this 
statute prohibited only homosexual sodomy, the Court evaluated the 
issues of privacy and due process present in Bowers, and the additional 
issue of whether a statute such as this violated one’s right to equal pro-
tection of the laws.40 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, opined: 
The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes 
that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual 
act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far- 
reaching consequences, touching upon the most private hu-
man conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of 
places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal 
relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recogni-
tion in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose with-
out being punished as criminals. 
                                                                                                                      
34 Id. at 190. 
35 Id. at 192, 195. 
36 Id. at 199–200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Herring v. State, 119 Ga. 709, 721 
(1904)). 
37 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196. 
38 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 200 (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting). 
39 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. This case was thus distinguished from Bowers because the 
Georgia statute had prohibited all acts of sodomy. Id. at 566. 
40 Id. at 564. 
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. . . When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct 
with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a 
personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by 
the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this 
choice.41 
The majority held that the right to privacy and the guarantee of lib-
erty in the Due Process Clause did, in fact, protect individuals from 
criminal prosecution for engaging in intimate acts.42 The Lawrence 
Court thus overruled Bowers and effectively invalidated any state laws 
prohibiting sodomy.43 
 Notably, the Lawrence court based its decision and the overruling 
of Bowers primarily on the right to privacy and the fundamental liberties 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; 
the majority declined to decide the issue on equal protection 
grounds.44 The majority explained that the equal protection challenge 
was “tenable” but that a decision on equal protection grounds would 
leave the Bowers holding intact—a holding recognized by the Lawrence 
Court as demeaning to the homosexual population.45 Even though the 
Court hinted that an equal protection claim would have been success-
ful, it said nothing to suggest what level of scrutiny it would have ap-
plied.46 Justice O’Connor concurred and evaluated the law under the 
rational basis test, ignoring all possibility that the gay population is a 
suspect class.47 She determined that the Texas statute failed even ra-
                                                                                                                      
41 Id. at 567 (emphasis added). 
42 Id. at 578. 
43 See id. 
44 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574–75. 
45 Id. This very point brought Justice O’Connor to write a concurring opinion in which 
she explained that Bowers should not have been overturned by Lawrence; Lawrence should 
have been decided on equal protection grounds alone because the statute at issue prohib-
ited only homosexual sodomy. Id. at 579–80 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
46 See id. at 574–75 (majority opinion). 
47 See id. at 579–80 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest 
under the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be 
“drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.” 
Texas’ invocation of moral disapproval as a legitimate state interest proves 
nothing more than Texas’ desire to criminalize homosexual sodomy. . . . And 
because Texas so rarely enforces its sodomy law as applied to private, consen-
sual acts, the law serves more as a statement of dislike and disapproval against 
homosexuals than as a tool to stop criminal behavior. 
Id. at 583. 
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tional basis review, the lowest level of scrutiny, because it was not ra-
tionally related to a legitimate government purpose.48 
 Despite the Lawrence Court’s refusal to analyze the equal protec-
tion claim, Justice O’Connor’s declaration that moral disapproval of a 
group was not a legitimate state interest was quickly drawn upon by 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.49 In the case of Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health, the court legalized gay marriage within the 
state.50 Here, seven gay couples applied for marriage licenses within 
the state and were denied on the ground that Massachusetts did not 
recognize same-sex marriage.51 The couples brought suit against the 
Department of Public Health, the state agency that had denied the 
applications.52 The court evaluated the statute under rational basis, 
and, citing specifically to Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence, 
held that the denial of the right to enter into a civil marriage failed; 
the majority reasoned that: 
The marriage ban works a deep and scarring hardship on a 
very real segment of the community for no rational reason. 
The absence of any reasonable relationship between, on the 
one hand, an absolute disqualification of same-sex couples 
who wish to enter into a civil marriage and, on the other, 
protection of public health, safety or general welfare, sug-
gests that the marriage restriction is rooted in persistent 
prejudices against persons who are (or who are believed to 
be) homosexual . . . . Limiting the protections, benefits, and 
obligations of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples violates 
the basic premises of individual liberty and equality under 
law protected by the Massachusetts Constitution.53 
After decades of refusal by the courts to acknowledge gay relationships, 
the Lawrence Court ended the criminalization of such relationships and 
the Goodridge decision took a dramatic step in declaring them both le-
gitimate and legally equal to heterosexual relationships.54 With the le-
                                                                                                                      
48 Id. 
49See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579–80 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (2003); Goodridge v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968, 973 (Mass. 2003). 
50 798 N.E.2d. at 968, 973. 
51 Id. at 313–15. 
52 Id. at 316. 
53 Id. at 341–42, 344. 
54 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d. at 969–70. 
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galization of gay marriage, even in a single state, came a national de-
bate over marriage, sexuality, and the role of the courts.55 
B. America up in Arms: A Violent Reaction to Goodridge 
 The proclamation in Goodridge that there was no rational basis for 
the same-sex marriage ban met with much social resistance.56 Presi-
dent Bush did not hesitate to confront the country with his moral dis-
dain regarding the decision.57 On February 24, 2004, the President 
informed America that “[t]he union of a man and woman is the most 
enduring human institution . . . honored and encouraged in all cul-
tures and by every religious faith.”58 President Bush proceeded to call 
upon Congress to support an amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
that would forever define and protect marriage as “a union of man 
and woman as husband and wife . . . .”59 Even when the proposed 
amendment was finally defeated in 2006, its supporters vowed not to 
give up until marriage was codified in the Constitution as the union 
of a man and a woman.60 A similar determination has driven forty-five 
states to adopt statutes and constitutional amendments defining tradi-
tional marriage and banning gay marriage.61 
 The will of the people, echoed in their support of state legislation 
banning gay marriage, is undoubtedly informed by the scholarly, reli-
gious, and popular discourse dissecting the issues inherent in gay mar-
                                                                                                                      
55 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d. at 969–70; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, G.O.P. Moves Fast to Reignite Is-
sue of Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 2006, at A1. 
56 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d. at 973; Stolberg, supra note 55. 
57 See Press Release, White House, President Calls for Constitutional Amendment Pro-
tecting Marriage (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
s004/02/20040224–2.html. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. The proposed Federal Marriage Amendment was defeated in the Senate in June 
2006, but even with its defeat, Republican Senators vowed eventual success. Shailagh 
Murray, Same-Sex Marriage Ban Is Defeated, Wash. Post, June 8, 2006, at 1. Senator Sam 
Brownback of Kansas promised not to give up: “We’re making progress, and we’re not 
going to stop until marriage between a man and a woman is protected . . . in the courts, 
protected in the Constitution, but most of all, protected for the people and for the future 
of our children in this society.” Id. 
60 Murray, supra note 59. An ABC News poll, released in June 2006, reported that forty-
two percent of Americans supported the Federal Marriage Amendment. Id. 
61 Id. Polls taken during the 2006 elections showed that support for legislation ban-
ning gay marriage in many states was wavering. Kirk Johnson, Gay Marriage Losing Punch as 
Ballot Issue, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 2006, at A1. This trend is attributable to increased support 
of gay marriage at the polls as many gay activist groups have worked diligently to increase 
voter turnout. See id. 
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riage.62 Christian scholars, including Pope John Paul II, have declared 
that gay marriage must be illegal because it is a moral abomination.63 
But the U.S. Supreme Court swiftly addressed this morality-based justi-
fication for laws that disadvantage gay people when it explained in Law-
rence that moral disapproval of a group does not qualify as a legitimate 
government interest.64 
 Moral arguments thus discounted, scholars have focused largely on 
history and sociology in an attempt to articulate a legitimate, if not a 
compelling, government interest.65 These formulations attempt to pro-
vide a legally sound defense of traditional marriage and, in turn, a le-
gally sound argument for the prohibition of gay marriage.66 The argu-
ments have centered primarily on: (1) the importance of heterosexual 
marriage and family to the proper upbringing of children, and (2) the 
                                                                                                                      
62 See Foucoult, supra note 4, at 43, 97–102. 
63 Rebecca Allison, Pope Calls for Halt to ‘Evil Gay Marriages’, Guardian (London), Aug. 
1, 2003, at 1. Pope John Paul II issued a papal note in which he informed all Catholic legis-
lators of a moral duty to oppose all measures aimed at legalizing gay marriage: 
There are absolutely no grounds for considering homosexual unions to be in 
any way similar or even remotely analogous to God’s plan for marriage and 
family. Marriage is holy, while homosexual acts go against the natural moral 
law. 
 . . . . 
Legal recognition of homosexual unions or placing them on the same level as 
marriage would mean not only the approval of deviant behaviour . . . but 
would also obscure basic values which belong to the common inheritance of 
humanity. 
Gay Unions Defy God Says Vatican, Guardian (London), Aug. 1, 2003, at 12. 
In an even more radical tone, Dr. James Dobson, a Christian radio show host, foretold 
the downfall of the traditional and biblical family unit and the suffering of children raised 
by gay parents. James Dobson, Ten Arguments Against Gay Marriage, available at http://www. 
nogaymarriage.com/tenarguments.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). For Dobson, the allow-
ance of gay marriage would inevitably compromise the moral nature of public schools, 
force foster parents to “affirm homosexuality in children and teens,” and allow every ho-
mosexual to leach expensive health insurance benefits from his or her now legally-recog-
nized spouse. Id. 
64 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583. 
65See George Dent, Traditional Marriage: Still Worth Defending, 18 BYU J. Pub. L. 419, 
420, 428–29 (2004); Dwight Duncan, The Federal Marriage Amendment and Rule by Judges, 27 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 543, 552 (2004) (arguing that gay marriage should be illegal for 
the sake of childrens’ upbringing). Dent describes the benefits children reap when raised 
by heterosexual married parents and argues that the traditional meaning of marriage 
should not be altered because it has historically provided incentive to heterosexual couples 
by recognizing their union and providing them with a sense of honor. Dent, supra, at 428–
29. 
66 See Dent, supra note 65, at 420, 429; Duncan, supra note 65, at 552. 
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historical, cultural, and social meaning of marriage that cannot and 
should not be reconceptualized.67 
 Those who oppose gay marriage and assert the well-being of 
children as a legitimate or compelling interest explain that children 
can only come about through heterosexual union, and so common 
sense dictates that children are better raised by a mother and a fa-
ther.68 Furthermore, the argument goes, children raised by married 
biological parents fare better by every measure—physical and mental 
health, academic performance, social adjustment, and obedience to 
the law.69 Finally, gay marriage opponents argue that gay parents will 
not have the same devotion to the responsibility of raising children 
that heterosexual parents have, because biological parents are respon-
sible for the very creation of the children.70 
 Supporters of gay marriage are equally concerned with the well-
being of children.71 They point to studies that not only debunk social 
myths and stigmas traditionally attached to the “gay lifestyle” but also 
demonstrate that homosexual and heterosexual lifestyles are remarka-
bly similar, especially when it comes to parenting skills.72 In fact, the 
American Psychological Association (APA) has stated that not a single 
study has found that children raised by gay parents are in any way dis-
advantaged compared to those raised by heterosexual parents.73 More-
over, the APA has cited research that actually suggests lesbian and gay 
parents are better parents than heterosexual couples; same-sex couples 
are less likely to use physical punishment, are more likely to use reason-
ing in admonishing their children, and are more in-tune with their 
children’s feelings.74 In short, extensive studies deflate the arguments 
                                                                                                                      
67 See Dent, supra note 65, at 420, 429; Duncan, supra note 65, at 552. 
68 Duncan, supra note 65, at 552. 
69 Dent, supra note 65, at 428–29. Notably, the study Dent uses to support his argument 
was explained in a New York Times article that never explicitly compares heterosexual and 
homosexual parents, but instead explains that social scientists have reached a consensus 
concerning single-parent families. See id. at 429 n.43. The study views the single-parent 
family as the reason for “decades of child poverty, delinquency, and crime” and states that 
a growing body of social research concludes that the most supportive household contains 
two biological parents in a low-conflict marriage. Id. 
70 Id. at 432. 
71 See Adrienne Butcher, Selective Constitutional Analysis in Lawrence v. Texas, 41 Hous. 
L. Rev. 1407, 1425 (2004). 
72 Butcher, supra note 71, at 1425. 
73 Am. Psychological Ass’n, Lesbian and Gay Parenting 15 (2005), available at http:// 
www.apa.org/pi/lgbc/publications/lgpconclusion.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). 
74 Id. at 8. 
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that heterosexual, biological, married parents are more fit to raise chil-
dren.75 
 Opponents of gay marriage also cite the importance of maintain-
ing the historical, cultural and social meaning of marriage.76 They 
argue that the meaning of marriage should not be compromised be-
cause it has historically acted as a source of honor for heterosexual 
couples.77 Further, there is a “consensus offered by history—spanning 
time and space and cultural and religious differences—that marriage 
is uniquely a relationship between the sexes, naturally related to pro-
creation and the upbringing of children . . . .”78 Because society has 
an interest in future generations, the argument goes, and because the 
conjugal acts between men and women create these future genera-
tions, society has an interest in promoting and protecting laws that 
reserve marriage for the union of one man to one woman.79 
 Advocates of gay marriage counter that marriage has meant many 
different things historically and that the term still varies in meaning 
depending on cultural and social values.80 For much of history, most 
cultures have endorsed and practiced polygamy—one man marrying 
several women.81 Moreover, marriages were generally arranged by par-
ents whose decisions as to who would be a good spouse for their child 
were often not informed by said child’s love interests, but instead by a 
desire to achieve social goals or to obtain social goods.82 In this way, 
marriage was “largely a matter of business: cementing family ties, forg-
ing social and economic alliances, providing social status for men and 
economic security for women, conferring dowries, and so on.”83 If 
nothing else, history clearly indicates that procreation along with suc-
cessful child-rearing was never the single purpose and reason for the 
institution of marriage, much less that there was one single reason for 
marriage at all.84 The supposed deeply embedded historical, social, and 
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76 See Dent, supra note 65, at 420; Duncan, supra note 65, at 550. 
77 Dent, supra note 65, at 421. 
78 Duncan, supra note 65, at 551. 
79 See Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Like It or Not . . . The Marriage Amendment Is the Democratic 
Way, National Review Online, July 8, 2004, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/ 
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81 Id. at 15. 
82 Id. at 16. 
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cultural meaning of marriage appears to be more of a mutable rela-
tionship between two or more parties.85 
 Though the arguments on both sides of the gay marriage debate 
have encouraged and even demanded careful contemplation by the 
American public, they have also left many important questions un-
asked.86 The courts, the legislatures, and the American public need to 
be well-informed of the politics and the history involved in the crea-
tion of the deviant homosexual identity that has ignited the debate; 
only then can the gay claim to suspect classification and marriage 
rights be properly evaluated.87 
II. Queer Construction: Identity Politics and the Making of 
Gay Perversion 
The ideal King reigns over everything as far as the eye can see. His eye. 
What he cannot see is not royal, not real. He sees what is proper to him. To 
be real is to be visible to the King.88 
 
 Meaningful engagement in the gay marriage debate requires 
both an informed understanding of legal precedent and reasoning, 
and a critical consciousness of the process by which gay identities have 
been labeled perverse.89 Acquiring such consciousness, in turn, re-
quires a basic knowledge of the process by which these identities have 
been historically constructed through the production and dissemina-
tion of scientific and legal discourse.90 Michel Foucault explains this 
process in theoretical terms, and provides a real-life example through 
a review of the past one-hundred years of scientific and medical dis-
course focused on the homosexual deviant.91 Throughout, Marilyn 
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Frye’s metaphor of “the King” is useful to understanding the ultimate 
reality of identity politics: discourse dominantly produced by a het-
erosexual white male majority (the King) has served throughout his-
tory to define many minority populations out of reality by creating 
ideas of their inferiority, depravity, and ineptitude.92 Most recently, 
this process has focused on the gay minority and laws attempting to 
ban its meaningful existence are only some of the more serious mani-
festations of identity politics.93 
A. Power-Knowledge and the Docile Body 
 Foucault begins by defining the power-knowledge dichotomy, or 
the idea that power is knowledge and knowledge is power.94 For Fou-
cault, the ability and opportunity to participate in the discursive realm 
is a crucial form and generator of power.95 Discourse, according to 
Foucault, serves two very powerful purposes within society: (1) inform-
ing, and indeed, forming individual identities; and (2) generating 
widespread notions about normalcy which ultimately create social 
norms enforced by the general population.96 Discourse is the very 
means by which individuals inform their own identities and their per-
ceptions of the identities of others.97 One who creates knowledge thus 
exercises power by generating conceptions that will be spread among 
the masses, absorbed, duplicated, and ultimately imposed on or inter-
nalized by another individual in creating her identity.98 For example, a 
young girl will learn from the time she is a toddler what are acceptable 
feminine activities and attributes.99 While early instruction will come 
from her parents, as a young adult, she will be influenced by countless 
books, magazine articles, clothing ads, and the like as she is exposed to 
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the popular discourse of femininity.100 Foucault theorizes that this 
process is effective because bodies are docile, capable of being “sub-
jected, used, transformed, and improved” by such internalization and 
imposition.101 At the same time, the discourse becomes even more ef-
fective when accepted by a majority that inherently creates widespread 
ideas and judgments about what is “normal.”102 This transition results 
in a social norm, internalized by individuals, which will further disci-
pline or control them by demanding conformance lest they be labeled 
outcasts.103 Thus, the power of knowledge creation and dissemination 
does not depend solely on one individual’s internalization of its mes-
sage, but instead is buttressed with the acceptance by a majority who 
will enforce its message regardless of the individual.104 
 These theories of power-knowledge and the docile body are evi-
dent in Foucault’s History of Sexuality, in which he explains that sexual 
identities have not always existed.105 In fact, we only came to attach 
identities to sexual acts during the eighteenth century when the fields 
of medicine, psychiatry, and education produced discourse of sexual 
identity and the self.106 Prior to this attachment, homosexual acts were 
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Id. 
105 Foucault, supra note 4, at 37–39, 103–05. 
106 Id. at 37–39, 103–05. 
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performed without the individual ever being labeled as a certain type, 
let alone a certain type of pervert.107 Foucault explains: 
 [Sexuality] is the name that can be given to a historical 
construct: not a furtive reality that is difficult to grasp, but a 
great surface network in which stimulation of bodies, the in-
tensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the 
formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of con-
trols and resistances, are linked to one another, in a few ma-
jor strategies of knowledge and power.108 
Notably, even once sexual acts were attached to sexual identities by dis-
course, homosexual identities were not immediately named deviant, or 
at least homosexuality was not understood as more deviant than het-
erosexuality.109 As late as the early 1900s, medical journals were defin-
ing heterosexuality as the “abnormal or perverted appetite toward the 
opposite sex.”110 Homosexual and heterosexual thus refer to histori-
cally specific identities and practices contingent on ideas of masculinity, 
femininity, and lust.111 In other words, sexual identities are not perma-
nent or fixed realities, but are defined by ever-changing medical dis-
course; only within the last 100 years has the homosexual been defined 
as perverse and abnormal and the heterosexual defined as normal.112 
B. Perverse Implantation: The Process of Constructing Gay Deviance 
 Prior to the nineteenth century, there was no specific identity at-
tached to those individuals who engaged in acts that are now consid-
ered homosexual.113 The homosexual, as a person, did not exist.114 Be-
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ginning in the late 1800s, homosexuality was defined as deviant and was 
understood as representing an individual’s tendency toward perverse 
acts, “as evidence of innate moral inferiority as well as biological defi-
ciency.”115 Homosexuality came to be conceptualized as the adaptive 
result of cultural advancement; the homosexual population consisted 
of those bodies that had lost their adaptive ability, and so as culture 
progressed, their nervous systems were broken down by stress, and 
their primitive instincts ran free.116 Beginning in the early 1900s, ex-
perts developed the theory of sexual inversion, explaining that the gay 
population embodied physical and behavioral characteristics of the op-
posite sex.117 Some experts even asserted that gays comprised a third 
biological sex.118 
 During the first half of the twentieth century, popular scientific 
discourse focused less on what caused homosexuality and more on 
how to identify members of the gay population.119 Historically, this 
was a period in which the threat of a declining white race was at the 
forefront of the political and social consciousness in America as inter-
racial relations and perverse sexual behavior (homosexuality, prostitu-
tion, and overpopulation of the poor) were viewed as a threatening 
deterioration of all social hygiene standards.120 In the 1930s and 40s, 
the Sex Variant Study was conducted by various scientists in New York 
City in order to determine the signifying physical characteristics of sex 
variants from the complexion of skin to the shape and size of geni-
tals.121 Detecting the signs of homosexuality was intricately connected 
to the larger socially eugenic campaign to foster marriage and repro-
duction among the fit.122 The Sex Variant Study is an obvious example 
of the process by which discourse created by scientific experts and 
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applied to docile bodies has historically rendered gay bodies deviant 
others.123 Scholar Jennifer Terry observed that the study was “as much 
an effort to construct and maintain hygienic heterosexuality as it was 
to investigate homosexuality.”124 
 More recent scientific and medical research has focused, once 
again, on what causes homosexuality.125 Genetic studies have focused 
on heritability by attempting to determine whether there is a higher 
occurrence of homosexuality in genetically identical pairs of twins as 
opposed to non-genetically identical pairs.126 Experts involved in psy-
choendocrine studies have examined the correlation between prenatal 
hormone levels and adult homosexuality.127 These scientists search for 
a cause of homosexuality by attempting to locate and scrutinize ab-
normal amounts of, or insensitivity to, androgens in the uterus that 
can, hypothetically, later result in sexual ambiguity or abnormal sexual 
tendencies toward members of the same sex.128 Neuroanatomic studies 
of late have been most concerned with the hypothalamus; some have 
found a correlation between an enlarged hypothalamus and homo-
sexuality while others have found a correlation between a shrunken 
hypothalamus and homosexuality.129 Finally, geneticists claim to have 
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located the biological cause of homosexuality in genes located on the X 
chromosome.130 Whether the cause of homosexuality is located in the 
hypothalamus or on the X chromosome, the source of its supposed de-
viance can be located in the search itself.131 
 The very persistence of current attempts to find the cause of ho-
mosexuality and the resulting discourse bespeak continuing disdain for 
the gay population.132 But even if homosexuality is proven to be a bio-
logical phenomenon, as long as mainstream discourse maintains the 
perverse implantation—the process of creating perverse gay identities 
via discourse—there will be no social acceptance of the gay popula-
tion.133 
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C. Suspicious Motivation to Maintain the “Other” 
 Perhaps even more important than understanding the different 
ways in which experts have tried to explain homosexuality, then, is 
understanding why such experts have been so dedicated, so persis-
tent, so determined to do so.134 Marilyn Frye astutely points out: 
“Where there is manipulation, there is motivation . . . the meaning of 
this erasure (from the King’s reality) and of the totality and conclu-
siveness of it, has more to do, I think, with the maintenance of phal-
locratic reality as a whole.”135 Other scholars have echoed this theory, 
suggesting that the creation of homosexuality as a “third sex” leaves 
assumptions about heterosexuality and gender polarity in place by 
placing the variants in a category of other.136 Patriarchal heterosexist 
society depends in large part on static gender roles and a norm of 
heterosexual relationships in which women succumb to male domi-
nance; where men and women defy this norm, the foundation of male 
dominance fails.137 
 The perverse implantation, or the process by which homosexuals 
were labeled deviant, is not the first use of power-knowledge to disad-
vantage an entire class of persons in order to maintain a powerful 
white heterosexist majority: blacks and women have suffered similar 
stigmatization.138 Not surprisingly, here again, stereotypes were used 
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to support legal and social discrimination.139 Largely scientific and 
anthropological discourse worked to create a lesser, more primitive, 
deviant black population that was then exposed to slavery, social ine-
quality, and blatant discrimination.140 The process began with colonial 
powers and slave-owning countries intent on justifying the dehuman-
izing torture of black individuals.141 Historian Sven Lindqvist exam-
ines the work of French scientist George Cuvier, who, during the 
1800s, ranked humans into racial categories and explained that the 
facial features of “negroid” races indicated their evolutionary prox-
imity to the primates.142 Early American schools of polygeny sup-
ported the view that blacks were another form of life, a separate bio-
logical species—one not capable of participating in the “equality of 
man” —scientists continuously studied the brains and bodies of blacks 
in order to substantiate these claims with scientific evidence.143 As re-
cently as the early 1990s, scientists Richard Herrnstein and Charles 
Murray published The Bell Curve, a text that summarized several stud-
ies providing scientific evidence that claims to prove an inherent infe-
riority in blacks based on IQ test scores.144 
 Historically, the same structures of power-knowledge that worked 
to create an inferior class of black citizens rendered the female iden-
tity one of fragility, lesser intelligence, hysterical sexuality, and emo-
tional instability.145 Medical literature documenting the hysterical and 
unstable mental condition of women has appeared throughout his-
tory.146 During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
scientists and doctors explained the female orgasm as the only means 
by which the female body and mind could be stabilized.147 Men, in-
formed by the popular discourse, routinely took their wives to medical 
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doctors who would bring the woman to orgasm so to purge her body 
of fluids believed to cause hystericism and insanity.148 Exaggerated 
stereotyping, buttressed by the belief that women were inherently un-
stable individuals, held that women were unsuited to the work of the 
world and should remain in the home.149 Such an understanding has 
long driven all-male societal power structures, and continues to be 
informed by scientific studies today.150 
 When blacks and women acted to challenge laws that disadvan-
taged them because of such stereotypes, they often met with little suc-
cess as the courts adopted the constructed inferiority as reason to up-
hold the laws.151 For example, in the case of Scott v. Sandford, in which 
Dred Scott, a slave, sued for his freedom, the Supreme Court ex-
plained that from the time the American Government was founded, 
African-Americans had been considered “beings of an inferior order, 
and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social 
or political relations . . . .”152 Similarly, in Bradwell v. Illinois, in which 
the plaintiff filed suit after having been denied admission to a local 
bar because she was a married woman, the Court stated: 
Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The 
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the 
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of 
civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is 
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of 
things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly 
belong to the domain and functions of womanhood.153 
America is thus well-acquainted with the process of constructing lesser 
identities for the purpose of maintaining the superiority of white het-
erosexual males.154 Commonly held stereotypes of the ineptitude of 
blacks and women alike have been carefully crafted by scientific realms 
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dominated by white heterosexual males basically seeking to maintain 
superiority by deeming all others inferior.155 The construction of gay 
deviance is, in this way, strikingly similar to that of blacks and women.156 
III. Stay In or Face the Consequences: The Peculiarities of the 
Gay Claim to Suspect Classification 
 What separates the construction of gay deviance from the con-
struction of black and female inferiority is the social structure com-
monly known as the closet that provides homosexuals with the option 
of concealment.157 The closet has been defined by some as the defin-
ing structure for gay oppression in modern times.158 Because of the 
closet, gays, unlike blacks or women, have the option of hiding their 
homosexual identity and being treated equally or “coming out” and 
suffering both legal and social discrimination.159 Arguably, laws that 
discriminate against gays are the most effective means by which the 
appeal of the closet is maintained; for only through full-time closeting 
and denial of one’s homosexual desire can a gay individual fully par-
ticipate in society as an equal, get married, have a family, and obtain 
other social goods.160 The possibility of the closet differentiates the 
classification of gay people from that of blacks and women, thus com-
plicating the gay claim to suspect classification.161 This complication 
should not preclude, but inform, the gay claim to suspect classifica-
tion.162 The purpose and policy that buttress current equal protection 
doctrine, taken together with the suspicious circumstance of the op-
tional closet, solidify the gay claim to suspect classification.163 
 In order to expand on existing doctrine and fairly examine the 
gay claim to equal protection, the purpose and the ideals inherent in 
the Equal Protection Clause must be first fully understood.164 An ex-
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amination of the criteria for suspect classification illuminates the ways 
in which the gay circumstance does not fall neatly within the bounds 
of existing equal protection doctrine.165 Despite apparent imperfec-
tions, once the gay claim to suspect classification is evaluated against 
the backdrop of constructed deviance that has resulted in an optional 
closet, the gay population’s situation appears even more suspicious 
than that of historically suspect classes.166 
A. Official Motivation Matters: Equal Protection as a Check on the Majority 
 The Equal Protection Clause does not require that every law treat 
everyone equally; laws are often written specifically for the purpose of 
sorting people out for differential treatment.167 Because of the neces-
sity of distinction, three levels of scrutiny are applied within equal pro-
tection doctrine to determine whether a law distinguishes in a way in-
dicative of democratic malfunction and thus violates the clause: strict 
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis.168 Strict scrutiny is 
reserved for those laws that affect a suspect class, or a discrete and insu-
lar minority that has faced a history of purposefully unfair treatment 
and political powerlessness.169 To survive, the law must be narrowly tai-
lored to achieve a compelling government interest.170 Intermediate 
scrutiny is applied to laws that affect a quasi-suspect class, or a group 
that historically has been disadvantaged but does not meet the re-
quirements of suspect classification; the law will be held valid only if it is 
substantially related to an important government purpose.171 Rational 
basis is the default level of scrutiny applied to all laws that do not affect 
a suspect or quasi-suspect class; the law will pass muster as long as it is 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.172 
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1. Traditional Suspect Classification Criteria and Analysis 
 The level of scrutiny applied thus depends on who is being singled 
out for differential treatment by the law.173 The doctrine subjects laws 
singling out quasi-suspect or suspect classes to a form of heightened 
scrutiny because when a group of individuals possess the characteristics 
that define a suspect class, the courts will assume that the legislature is 
attempting to subjugate them or is making judgments based on stereo-
types.174 A class that has historically been subjected to unfair treatment, 
has little or no political power by which they may change their situa-
tion, and is comprised of members who are easily identifiable and iso-
lated from most of society, is in a socially and politically peculiar situa-
tion.175 Legislation that not only disregards the class’s situation but 
singles it out for differential treatment is closely scrutinized.176 
 In applying intermediate or strict scrutiny, the courts seek the true 
purpose of the law and to determine whether that purpose is constitu-
tional.177 Locating the true purpose necessarily involves examining the 
often unspoken motivation of the legislature, which is important be-
cause “it is inconsistent with constitutional norms to select people for 
unusual deprivation on the basis of race, religion, or politics, or even 
because the official doing the choosing doesn’t like them.”178 The his-
torical process by which gays have been defined as a deviant and per-
verse class has informed stereotypes regarding the fitness of gays to be 
married, have children, serve in the military, and the like; such stereo-
types have inevitably influenced Congress and state legislatures alike 
which have passed laws that reinforce the deviant identity and solidify 
the stereotypes.179 At first glance, there is something peculiar about the 
social and political situation of gays and about the closet itself—the op-
tion of claiming one’s identity and being discriminated against or deny-
ing it and being treated equally is no option at all.180 Legislation that 
imposes this option should be subjected to heightened review.181 
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2. An Alternative Criterion for Suspect Classification 
 The strictly defined standards of suspect classification may not al-
ways be sufficient to determine whether or not a group should be con-
sidered suspect.182 As Ely points out, the discrete and insular require-
ment could potentially fail the black population, the one group 
everyone seems to agree should be suspect: though blacks are still dis-
crete, many argue they are no longer insular as they participate in the 
larger society and are no longer legally segregated.183 Further, the re-
quirement of political powerlessness is complicated: both women and 
blacks have, at some historical point, been denied the right to vote as a 
group, but both have since been afforded that right and have now been 
able to vote for decades.184 Additionally, a voice and a vote are not al-
ways enough to ensure adequate political participation and representa-
tion.185 
 Because of these complexities, scholars have come to suggest that 
classifications rooted in stereotype should be regarded as suspicious.186 
In order to decide if a legislature had an unconstitutional motive in 
passing an act, the generalizations and stereotypes underlying the act 
must be understood.187 Key factors in deciding whether a stereotype is 
acceptable for government use include its origin, who created it, and 
whether the stereotype serves the interests of those affected by it.188 
Where the legislators of those they represent stand to gain socially or 
legally from the generalizations behind the questioned law, certain 
dangers inherent in any balancing process become intensified and may 
result in “an undervaluation of the interest in individual fairness.”189 In 
other words, legislators are likely to accept and promote those stereo-
types flattering to themselves even if the promotion of such beliefs 
comes at a social and legal cost to others; cost itself is likely to be un-
derestimated, therefore undervaluing the individual fairness that is key 
to representative democracy.190 
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 If classifications based on stereotype were treated as suspect, gays 
would probably constitute a suspect class given the long and well-
documented history of discourse that ultimately resulted in a stereo-
typed perverse identity and a closet in which to conceal that iden-
tity.191 That the stereotypes have an origin in medical and scientific 
discourse created primarily by the powerful white heterosexual male 
majority and that the maintenance of the stereotypes benefits the 
same majority would confirm the notion that there is something ill-
motivated about legislation that capitalizes on the deviant identity and 
disadvantages those who claim it.192 Within this analytical scheme, the 
resemblance between the classifications of blacks and women and that 
of gays is striking: all have been based on stereotypes constructed by 
the power structures of medicine and science and codified by legisla-
tures determined to maintain social and political superiority.193 Blacks 
have been a suspect class since the inception of equal protection doc-
trine and women were once considered a suspect class.194 The gay 
population, it would follow, having been subject to the same social 
and political disenfranchisement because of stereotype and its codifica-
tion, should be regarded as a suspect class.195 As such, laws that single 
them out for mistreatment should be subject to strict scrutiny.196 
 Of course, analyzing suspect classification as classification based on 
stereotype is, to date, a purely academic exercise because courts have 
not strayed meaningfully from their three-tier system of analyzing equal 
protection claims.197 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has noted the 
unacceptability of legislation based on prejudice toward a specific 
group—namely, that laws based on stereotypes cannot even survive ra-
tional basis review because maintaining stereotypes can never serve 
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even a legitimate state interest.198 In keeping with any court’s likely 
analysis, however, the remaining examination of the gay claim to sus-
pect classification will focus on traditional suspect classification crite-
ria.199 
B. Analyzing the Gay Claim to Suspect Classification 
 Though the social and political situation of gay individuals is dif-
ferent from that of other suspect classes, it is equally if not more pecu-
liar.200 A legislature that acts to reinforce that situation should be re-
quired to offer compelling justification.201 Suspect classification re-
quires that the group be a discrete and insular minority which has suf-
fered a history of purposefully unfair treatment and political power-
lessness.202 Only when an individual is decided to be part of a suspect 
group will one’s legal claims of discrimination be examined under strict 
scrutiny.203 The gay claim to suspect classification is complicated be-
cause the closet provides each individual the option of concealing the 
very trait that is discriminated against—a choice not afforded any other 
suspect class to date.204 This peculiarity both skews and strengthens the 
analysis of the gay claim to suspect classification: (1) only those who 
have come out and claimed their gay identity are discrete, insular, and 
discriminated against, and (2) the very fact that coming out is optional 
renders the class, as a whole, politically disjointed and powerless.205 The 
implied ultimatum forcing gay individuals to remain closeted or come 
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out and face the consequences is itself incredibly suspicious.206 Legisla-
tion that solidifies the ultimatum should be subject to strict scrutiny.207 
1. Discrete and Insular Minority 
Requiring that a group be a discrete and insular minority before it 
can be considered a suspect class ensures that suspect classification is 
reserved for groups that are “race-like” in that their members are an 
easily identifiable minority generally isolated from the majority.208 
This situation lends itself to discrimination by the majority because 
members of the suspect group are easily identified for purposeful mis-
treatment and, as part of a socially isolated minority, are less capable 
of bringing about change in their situation via the political process.209 
 The gay population is clearly a minority: studies estimate that 
gays comprise only three to thirteen percent of the population.210 But 
they are discrete only once they refuse the security of the closet, and 
even then they are insular in a way that is unique among suspect 
classes.211 Whereas blacks generally do not have the option of not be-
ing discrete, gays do because they can closet the trait being discrimi-
nated against.212 Mab Segrest, a feminist scholar, explains that incen-
tives exist to pass as white “under a regime of white supremacy” just as 
they exist to pass as a heterosexual “under heterosexist regimes.”213 In 
other words, had their identity been concealable behind closet doors, 
the black plight for equal protection and suspect classification would 
have been of a similar nature to that of homosexuals.214 
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 For the gay individual, insularity is intricately tied to discreteness: 
many of those who choose to come out also choose to remain discrete 
by isolating themselves from the rest of society and residing in gay-
majority communities.215 Those who succumb to the social and legal 
pressure to remain closeted generally refuse to associate with the gay-
majority communities.216 As a result, many gay individuals are not in-
sular in the sense anticipated by the Supreme Court because they live 
dispersed among the heterosexual population.217 This dispersion re-
sults in their political isolation and inability to change their situation 
via the democratic process.218 Ultimately, when gay individuals natu-
rally opt for social and legal equality by remaining in the closet, they 
compromise the discreteness and insularity of gays as a class and thus 
their claim for suspect classification.219 
 As if the social discrimination were not powerful enough, the 
laws that discriminate against gays consistently discourage gay individu-
als from being discrete or insular lest they be denied certain rights 
like marriage and adoption.220 Thus, the stereotype of the homosex-
ual pervert and the closet will be maintained if the current standards 
of suspect classifications are strictly applied because gays, in an at-
tempt to avoid discrimination, choose to be neither discrete nor insu-
lar.221 In order to fulfill the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause, 
the courts must recognize the profoundly unique and suspicious posi-
tion of the gay population.222 
2. History of Purposeful Unfair Treatment 
 The option of closeted existence is not only embraced by many 
gay individuals as a means to avoid discreteness and insularity but also 
as a means to avoid unfair treatment.223 Homosexuals who have come 
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out are denied many social goods and opportunities.224 For example, 
gay marriage is prohibited by all states but Massachusetts, and Florida 
denies all adoption rights to gay individuals.225 Those who admit that 
they are gay during a job interview are less likely to be hired, and even 
if they are hired, workplace harassment of gay employees is ram-
pant.226 Gay people who claim their identity risk losing even the basic 
ability to exist in public without falling victim to a hate crime.227 
 While all of the consequences of “coming out” undoubtedly en-
courage the gay population to remain closeted, a particularly egre-
gious example of purposeful unfair treatment suffered by the gay 
population is the commission of hate crimes.228 In early 2006, an 
eighteen-year-old male went to a gay bar in Massachusetts where he 
attacked two patrons with a hatchet, shot them both in the head, and 
then shot a third patron in the abdomen.229 This horrific instance is 
just one of many striking examples of hate crimes targeting the gay 
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population; of all hate crimes committed in 2005, those directed at 
gay individuals comprised the third largest category.230 
 Here again, the purposeful unfair treatment is only suffered by 
those who refuse to closet their identities, and so the threat of suffer-
ing social and legal turmoil works to maintain the appeal of the closet 
and, in turn, to prevent the gay class as a whole from coming out and 
suffering unfair treatment.231 Given the threat of social and legal dis-
advantage as well as outright violence, it is understandable why many 
gay individuals welcome the option of the closet.232 But such an un-
fortunate option must not compromise their claim to suspect classifi-
cation; instead, the choice and the awful consequences that make the 
closet so appealing must be considered suspicious.233 
3. History of Political Powerlessness 
 Because the threat of social and legal injustice maintains the ap-
peal of the closet so efficiently, the gay class, as a whole, is unable to 
unify politically.234 Professor Kenneth Sherrill points out: 
The relative political powerlessness of gay people stands in a 
contradistinction to their depiction by advocates of ‘tradi-
tional values’ as a powerful movement advancing a ‘gay 
agenda’ in American politics. . . . [T]he attention paid to the 
occasional electoral victories of openly lesbian and gay candi-
dates distorts the reality that fewer than one tenth of 1 per-
cent of all elected officials in the United States are openly les-
bian, gay, or bisexual.235 
Rare local victories, according to Sherrill, are not indicative of the na-
tional political power of the group.236 
 Not only are gays a small minority (three to thirteen percent of 
the population), unlike other minorities that are typically grouped 
together geographically, gays are rarely found in gay-majority 
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neighborhoods where their political power could be maximized.237 As 
a result, in a representative democracy, gay voters must depend on the 
support of heterosexuals if they are to make advancements on the po-
litical front.238 But this support does not come easily because candi-
dates who want to win are unlikely to create a platform that supports 
the rights of an unpopular minority group like gays.239 Potential het-
erosexual advocates are further deterred by the fear that they might 
be perceived (and mistreated) as a homosexual if they pursue the gay 
agenda.240 Finally, because a vast majority of gay individuals are born 
into heterosexual homes, they are raised to accept heterosexual 
norms and are expected to act as if they are heterosexual.241 Thus, 
upon entering into adulthood and considering political beliefs, a gay 
individual is likely to struggle with what a gay political agenda would 
entail.242 The individual struggle translates into a class-wide deficiency 
in political unification and collective identity.243 
 Ultimately, the precarious political situation of the gay class is only 
worsened by the ever-beckoning closet which promises safety from mis-
treatment but simultaneously prevents the gay population from engag-
ing in meaningful political organization.244 So, though the gay popula-
tion may not be considered politically powerless in the traditional sense 
of having been denied the right to vote, the mechanics of the closet 
and the fear of social and legal reprisal work to render the gay class un-
able to unify, unable to form alliances with the powerful, and largely 
unable to determine what gay political consciousness would even look 
like.245 
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IV. Statutes Banning Gay Marriage Likely Fail Strict 
Scrutiny Review 
 If the courts recognize the peculiar circumstance of the gay popu-
lation and the ways in which the closet defines and strengthens their 
claim to suspect classification, laws discriminating against gay individu-
als will be subject to strict scrutiny review.246 In order for laws banning 
gay marriage to survive, the government must demonstrate that they 
are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.247 
 Of the arguments offered by opponents of gay marriage, for ex-
ample, that heterosexual parents are best-suited to raise children and 
that the historical meaning of marriage must be preserved, it is likely 
that only the promotion of the well-being of children could be consid-
ered a compelling government interest.248 First, it can be shown that 
marriage does not have one historical meaning but is instead a socially 
and culturally specific construct that has evolved from the union of 
many to the union of two.249 Second, compelling government interests 
are generally limited to the promotion of health, safety, and welfare, 
none of which seem to include the preservation of socially-constructed 
ideals of marriage.250 
 Though the promotion of the well-being of children could be 
accepted as a compelling government interest, a state that bans gay 
marriage but allows individual gay adoption will probably be unsuc-
cessful in arguing that its marriage laws are narrowly tailored to 
achieve the interest.251 A state government defending a law that de-
nies gay marriage rights cannot justify the legislation as a measure to 
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promote the proper upbringing of children when it legally allows gay 
individuals to adopt and raise children.252 
 Laws banning all gay marriage for the purpose of promoting the 
proper upbringing of children fail strict scrutiny analysis in another 
regard: such laws are, at once, both too narrow and too broad.253 A 
statute prohibiting gay marriage in order to promote the best inter-
ests of children is too narrow in that it fails to prevent unfit, hetero-
sexual individuals from becoming parents.254 If the state interferes 
with an unfit parent’s rights at all, for example by removing the child 
from the home, it is only after the individual parent has demonstrated 
a willingness and ability to harm the child.255 At the same time, the 
statute is too broad; by prohibiting all gay marriage it prohibits some 
couples who have no interest in having children from attaining the 
benefits of marriage and inevitably prevents those gay couples who 
would be excellent parents from having and raising children as a mar-
ried couple.256 Marriage laws that deny gays equal rights thus violate 
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection, but such violation 
only becomes clear only once gays are considered a suspect class. 
Conclusion 
 Though the gay marriage debate has forced significant reflection 
about the importance of marriage and family, it has also involved a 
heated exchange regarding the assumed deviance and perversion of 
gay individuals. This discussion is problematic in that it consistently 
disregards the process by which the gay identity was constructed as 
inferior to the heterosexual identity—the same process created the 
black identity inferior to the white and the female identity lesser to 
the male. The optional closet was constructed alongside the perverse 
implantation distinguishing the gay situation from that of blacks and 
                                                                                                                      
252 See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730. 
253 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 622 (1996) (explaining that a Colorado amend-
ment that prohibited gay anti-discrimination legislation from being passed was at once too 
narrow and too broad to even pass rational basis muster). 
254 See Elizabeth Bartholet, Nobody’s Children: Abuse and Neglect, Foster 
Drift and the Adoption Alternative 7–8 (1999). 
255 See id. (arguing that the state is too deferential to parents’ rights and too hesitant to 
remove a child from the home when she is known to have been abused). 
256 Am. Psychological Ass’n, supra note 73, at 8. Some studies have even found that 
having married parents matters most to the successful upbringing of children; such studies 
could support an argument that banning gay marriage is counter to the best interest of 
children because gay individuals can adopt children in many states but cannot provide 
them the benefit of married parents. See Dent, supra note 65, at 447 n.43. 
202 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 28:167 
women: gays can conceal their supposed perversion by refusing to 
“come out” whereas blacks and women never had such an option. The 
closet and the option of concealment give gay individuals the option 
of either denying their sexual identity or expressing it and being dis-
criminated against. If the gay claim to constitutional equal protection 
is ever to be fairly evaluated, the nuances of the closet and the ways in 
which it informs their claim to suspect classification must be fully un-
derstood by courts and legislatures alike. 
 In order to be considered a suspect class, a group must be a dis-
crete and insular minority population that has suffered a history of 
purposefully unfair treatment and political powerlessness. Social and 
legal discrimination continuously encourage gay people to remain in 
the closet, which potentially compromises their claim to suspect classi-
fication. Only gays who are discrete, who come out, are discriminated 
against in employment and housing opportunities, fall victim to hate 
crimes, are denied marriage and adoption rights, and the like. The 
court must acknowledge the ultimatum of “stay in or face the conse-
quences” as suspicious in itself, thus recognizing gays as a suspect class 
and subjecting laws that discriminate against them to strict scrutiny 
review. Once subjected to more searching review, laws banning gay 
marriage will likely be held unconstitutional as a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
